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The Robinson-Patman Act: Back where It Started?
Throughout its history the Robinson-Patman Act (hereinafter
"the Act") has been heavily criticized and extremely controversial.
Courts have repeatedly interpreted the Act's purpose and scope in
an inconsistent manner. Antitrust scholars have differed over the
Act's effectiveness and necessity. As a result, the current status of
Robinson-Patman law is quite confusing.
The purpose of this comment is to guide antitrust practitioners
who face difficult Robinson-Patman issues. The following analysis
is also intended to enlighten those practitioners who feel that the
Robinson-Patman Act has become obsolete. This comment will
show that the Act must still be taken seriously. This comment will
also illustrate how recent interpretations of the Act, contrary to
earlier interpretations, have been more consistent with the Act's
original purpose. Such a trend clearly shows that the Act has returned to its roots.
The following analysis will focus primarily on the competitive
injury requirement which must be proved to support a cause of
action under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act.1 A large number of
Robinson-Patman cases are pursued under section 2(a). The competitive injury requirement is perhaps the most controversial and
confused area of Robinson-Patman law.
This comment will provide an introduction to the Act's language
and purpose. Also, both earlier cases and more recent decisions
which have dealt with the competitive injury issue will be examined. The competitive injury issue will be analyzed in both primary line and secondary line cases. This comment will then examine whether the Act enhances or retards competition and
whether the Act is necessary or superfluous. Suggestions for improving the Act's effectiveness will be discussed, and counseling
advice will be provided.
1. 15 USC § 13(a) (1936). To meet the burden of proving competitive injury in a
Robinson-Patman proceeding, the plaintiff must show that the effect of the price discrimination "may be substantially to lessen competition or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition" with the defendant or the defendant's customers. Id. The competitive injury requirement will be the focus of the text.
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LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT

Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the RobinsonPatman Price Discrimination Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, either directly or
indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with the customers of either of them... as amended by 15 USC §
13(a) (1936) .2

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Act is
an incipiency or prophylactic statute.3 Thus the plaintiff does not
have to show that the defendant's conduct has, in fact, negatively
impacted competition.4 Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that it is reasonable that substantial competitive injury may
5
occur.
The Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act was
originated to protect small wholesalers and retailers from large
chain stores.' Uncertainty and fear were prevalent as a result of
the large chain store's potential growth and buying power.1 The
2. Compare this language with that of section 2 of the Clayton Act before it was
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2 of the Clayton Act originally read, in part:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... either directly or
indirectly to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities...
where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce..
15 USC § 13 (1914).
Notice that section 2 of the Clayton Act, before it was amended by the Act, did not specifically provide for injury to competition with any person who grants or induces price discrimination or with the customers of either of them. Thus the Act expanded the scope of
what constituted a price discrimination violation. Such expansion was intended to provide
better protection to small merchants who may have been injured as a result of price discrimination in favor of large chain stores.
3. Falls City Indus., Inc. v Banco Beverage, Inc., 460 US 428, 435 (1983).
4. Id.
5. InternationalAir Indus. v American Excelsior Co., 517 F2d 714, 728-29 (5th Cir
1975) (emphasis added).
6. Automatic Canteen Co. v FTC, 346 US 61, 62 (1953). See Paul H. LaRue, Competitive Injury - PrimaryLine, 53 Antitrust L J 863, 864 (1984). LaRue stated that many
persons believed that the Act was enacted by Congress in 1936 to prevent A&P and other
large corporations from driving smaller competitors out of business. LaRue, 53 Antitrust L J
at 864 (cited within this note).
7. J. Furman Lewis and Richard L. Horstman, Competitive Injury -Secondary/Tertiary Line, 53 Antitrust L J 891, 894 n.9 (1984). The authors detailed that Representative
Patman, in introducing his bill, explained that merchants, manufacturers and the public
needed protection from chain store giants. Lewis and Horstman, 53 Antitrust L J at 894 n.9
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Act was designed to "level the playing field"' among all competitors regardless of their size.
A primary motive for enacting the Act was to compensate for the
inability of the Clayton Act to protect small businesses from the
buying power of large chain stores in secondary line cases.9 Courts
had construed the original Clayton Act as requiring general injury
to competition. 10 There are conflicting opinions as to whether or
not the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act accomplished their
goal of protecting competitors.1 The line that separates the difference between injury to competitors and injury to competition generally is not easily drawn. 2 It is this issue which has created great
confusion for the courts and antitrust practitioners.13
COMPETITIVE INJURY CASES AND DEVELOPMENTS

A. Primary Line
A primary line case arises when the plaintiff who is a competitor
of the price discriminating defendant is allegedly injured and
brings suit. 14 Courts have had a difficult time differentiating be(cited within this note). Patman later testified before a House Judiciary Subcommittee that
he was not sure whether or not the elimination of independent merchants by chain stores
would be good or bad. Id. See Earl W. Kintner, 4 The Legislative History of the Federal
Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes 2927 (Chelsea House 1980).
8. H.L. Hayden Co. of NY, Inc. v Siemans Medical Sys., Inc., 672 F Supp 724, 743
(SD NY 1987).
9. Compare the language of section 2 of the Clayton Act before and after it was
amended by the Act. See note 2.
10. Lewis and Horstman, 53 Antitrust L J at 895 (cited in note 7).
11. Compare Lewis and Horstman, 53 Antitrust L J at 895 (cited in note 7) and Chris
S. Coutroulis, The Increasingly Pivotal Competitive Injury Requirement in Secondary
Line Cases under the Robinson-PatmanAct: Relevant Factors in Today's Environment, 57
Antitrust L J 935, 937 (1988-89). Lewis and Horstman stated that the Robinson-Patman Act
does "focus on particularized injury to competitors rather than on injury to competition
generally." Kintner, 4 The Legislative History at 2989 n.9 (cited in note 7). Coutroulis, on
the other hand, illustrated that the Act itself "speaks to the impact on competition not on
individual competitors." Coutroulis, 57 Antitrust L J at 937 (cited within this note). He
stated that injury must be to "competition in the relevant market generally" and that "injury to individual competitors, standing alone, does not establish a violation." Id. This comment will show that courts have also differed over what exactly the Act was intended to
protect.
12. Lewis and Horstman, 53 Antitrust L J at 895 (cited in note 7). The authors reviewed the Senate Report on the Robinson bill (the Senate Companion of the House's Patman bill). Id. The Senate report criticized section 2 of the Clayton Act for its general injury
to competition requirement. Kintner, 4 The Legislative History at 3015 (cited in note 7).
The report stated that such injury can only result from injuries to competitors. Id.
13. Coutroulis, 57 Antitrust L J at 937 (cited in note 11).
14. LaRue, 53 Antitrust L J at 863 (cited in note 6).
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tween conduct which constitutes a Robinson-Patman price discrimination violation as opposed to that which is good, sound price
competition. 5 A review of some of the most important cases and
developments in the area of primary line litigation follows.
The analysis begins with perhaps the most controversial primary
line decision. The Supreme Court of the United States in Utah Pie
Co. v Continental Baking Co.,"8 issued a decision that represents
the high-water mark for plaintiff recoveries in primary line Robinson-Patman litigation. The plaintiff and defendants were sellers of
frozen pies.' 7 The defendants were national sellers while the plain-

tiff was a local seller in the Salt Lake City market.' s The defendants cut their prices in the Salt Lake City area relative to their
national prices in order to increase their market shares in Salt
Lake City.' 9 As a result of the defendants' actions, the plaintiff's
market share decreased.20 The defendants' strategy also caused
prices in the Salt Lake City frozen pie market to dramatically
decline.2 '
The jury found that the defendants had committed geographic
price discrimination.22 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed
due to a lack of evidence to support a finding of competitive injury
under section 2.23 The Supreme Court of the United States held
that the defendants' conduct constituted predatory price discrimination.24 The Court stated that the defendants' below cost pricing
along with the defendants' placing of an industrial spy in the
plaintiff's plant were evidence of predation.2" However, the majority never defined what constituted below-cost pricing. The defendants' actions also constituted non-predatory price discrimination
because of their effect on market prices.28
The Court recognized that section 2(a) does not prohibit price
15. Id at 864.
16. 386 US 685 (1967), criticized in Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v Budget Rent-ACar Sys., 491 F Supp 1199 (D Haw 1980).
17. Utah Pie Co., 386 US at 689-91.
18. Id at 689.
19. Id at 690.
20. Id at 691 n.7. Plaintiff's market share declined from 66.5% in 1958 to 45.5% in
1960. Id.
21. Id at 690-91. Utah Pie's prices had decreased from $4.15 per dozen to $2.75 per
dozen during the relevant time period. Id.
22. Id at 687-88.
23. ContinentalBaking Co. v Utah Pie Co., 349 F2d 122, 152 (10th Cir 1965).
24. Utah Pie Co., 386 US at 693-701.
25. Id.
26. Id at 693-702.
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competition. However, the majority opined that the consistent
deterioration of prices would substantially lessen competition.28
Justices Stewart and Harlan, in their dissenting opinion, analyzed the market shares of each party before concluding that the
defendants had done nothing more than compete.2 9 In fact, the
dissenting Justices claimed that if the defendants' conduct had any
30
effect on competition, "that effect must have been beneficent.
The Justices lamented over the majority's decision which protected
individual competitors rather than competition generally.3 1 They
failed to reconcile the protection of Utah Pie's "monopolistic position" with the goals of federal antitrust laws. 2
The decision in Utah Pie Co. seems to go against the goals of
antitrust laws in general. Such laws were enacted to increase competition and limit monopolies. However, the United States Supreme Court punished the defendants for pro-competitive behavior. In effect, this decision protected Utah Pie's market share and
presumably forced consumers to pay higher prices for frozen pies.
Utah Pie remained the market leader in Salt Lake City despite the
defendants' price competition. The fact that Utah Pie was able to
meet its competitors' prices without suffering losses indicated that
price competition was desperately needed in the Salt Lake City
market. Consumers were paying a very high mark-up for Utah
Pie's product. As the dissent in Utah Pie Co. stated, it was a great
injustice that these defendants were found to have violated the
33
Robinson-Patman Act for pricing competitively.
Some pricing conduct by plaintiff's competitors resulted in a
Robinson-Patman violation while some did not. The decision inUtah Pie Co. did not clarify which facts were pertinent in determining whether a violation had occurred. Without a clear standard, confusion in this area persisted for eight more years. Neither
the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter "FTC") nor the courts
have clarified what constitutes predatory pricing.3 4 Courts in early
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id at 702.
Id at 703.
Id at 705.
Id.

31. Id. Justices Harlan and Stewart stated that the majority's holding incorrectly embraced the contention that Utah Pie was entitled to hold an extraordinary market share
percentage. The dissenters claimed that such a contention "falls of its own dead weight."
Continental Baking Co., 349 F2d at 155.
32. Utah Pie Co., 386 US at 706.
33. Id at 705.
34. Paul H. LaRue, The Robinson Patman Act: The Great Issues and Personalities,
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cases looked at the defendant's subjective intent, along with belowcost pricing and market analysis.3 5 Such decisions had a chilling
effect on competitive pricing conduct."
Developments in 1975 dramatically reduced the confusion that
existed. Professors Areeda and Turner of Harvard Law School proposed objective standards for predatory pricing.3 7 Such standards
looked only at whether price exceeded costs; they ignored subjective intent."8 Costs were defined as average variable costs.3 9 Using
these standards, a price above average variable cost is to be presumed lawful while a price below average variable cost is to be presumed unlawful.4 °
Courts have not completely adopted the Areeda and Turner
rules, but they have used these standards quite extensively.41 The
decision in Utah Pie Co. has never been overruled, and as a result
courts are using a hybrid of this decision and the Areeda and Tur42
ner rules to analyze predatory pricing.
The Ninth Circuit departed from these standards by considering
other facts of predation even when the price had exceeded average
55 Antitrust L J 135, 144 (1986).
35. LaRue, 55 Antitrust L J at 144 (cited in note 34). LaRue states that courts were
inconsistent in applying below-cost standards and that market analyses were not "economically sophisticated." Id. See Utah Pie Co., 386 US 685 (1967), because this decision drew
strong criticism for relying upon evidence of subjective intent, failing to define below cost
pricing, and for exercising a faulty market analysis. H. Thomas Austern, Presumption and
Percipienceabout Competitive Effect under Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 81 Harv L Rev
773, 779-84 (1968).
36. LaRue, 55 Antitrust L J at 144 (cited in note 34).
37. Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv L Rev 697, 716 (1975).
38. Areeda and Turner, 88 Harv L Rev at 716 (cited in note 37).
39. Id. Average variable cost is the total amount of variable costs divided by total
output. A price exceeding average variable cost contributes to the seller's fixed costs. Thus,
for each product sold the seller gets closer to making a profit. Id. Of course, differentiating
between fixed and variable costs is-easier said than done.
40. Id.
41. LaRue, 53 Antitrust L J at 868 (cited in note 6). See TransamericaComputer Co.
v IBM Corp., 698 F2d 1377 (9th Cir 1983), questioned in Southern Pac. Comms. Co. v
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 740 F2d 980 (DC Cir 1984), and Arthur S.
Largenderfer,Inc. v S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F2d 1050 (6th Cir 1984), for an illustration of
how the Ninth Circuit greatly departed from the Areeda and Turner guidelines by considering factors other than price, even when such price exceeded total costs. Id.
42. LaRue, 53 Antitrust L J at 869 (cited in note 6). See Barry Wright Corp. v ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F2d 227 (1st Cir 1983), and Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F2d 1050 (6th Cir 1984), questioned in Tasty Baking Co. v Ralston Purina,
Inc., 653 F Supp 1250 (ED Pa 1987). The courts in these two cases have rejected the Ninth
Circuit's departure from the Areeda and Turner rules in TransamericaComputer Co., 698
F2d 1377 (9th Cir 1983).
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total cost.43 However, the First and Sixth Circuits have rejected
this approach. 44 The Third Circuit has held that a price below average variable cost is not conclusive of a Robinson-Patman primary line price discrimination violation.4 5
The Areeda and Turner rules have made proving competitive injury under section 2(a) much more difficult. 46 They have also
forced the FTC and the Department of Justice to abandon their
competitive injury standards which were much easier to prove.
Although these rules have not been clarified by the Supreme Court
of the United States, it seems that they have effectively neutralized the decision in Utah Pie Co. which threatened to make price
competition obsolete. In Double H. Plastics, Inc., v Sonoco Prods.
Co.,4 18 the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff must prove competitive injury by showing predatory intent or through market analysis. 49 Predatory intent can be inferred from below cost pricing or
from "expressed evidence." 50 The court, relying on its opinion in 0.
Hommel Co. v Ferro Corp.,51 defined predatory intent as conduct
which illustrates an intent to destroy a competitor in order to
achieve a monopoly position.52 The court ruled in favor of the defendant, stating that the document upon which the plaintiff based
its case did not demonstrate an intent to injure the plaintiff.5" The
defendant's conduct, it was held, was evidence of sound "business
43. Transamerica Computer Co, 698 F2d 1377 (9th Cir 1983).
44. Barry Wright Corp., 724 F2d 227 (1st Cir 1983); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc.,
729 F2d 1050 (6th Cir 1984).
45. 0. Hommel Co. v Ferro Corp., 659 F2d 340 (3d Cir 1981).
46. LaRue, 53 Antitrust L J at 869 (cited in note 6).
47. Id. Prior to the Areeda and Turner rules, the FTC and the Department of Justice
used the concept of "sale at unreasonably low prices" to prove competitive injury in primary
line cases. Id.
48. Double H. Plastics,Inc., v Sonoco Prods. Co., 732 F2d 351 (3d Cir 1983). In this
case, a producer of business machine cores sued its competitor for price discrimination
under the Act. Double H. Plastics,732 F2d 351.
49. Id at 354. The court defined competitive injury as injury or threat of injury to
competition. Id. See 0. Hommel Co., 659 F2d at 346. The court relied on this case in formulating its definition of competitive injury. Double H. Plastics,732 F2d at 354.
50. Double H. Plastics,732 F2d at 355. "Expressed evidence" in this context means
overt actions other than pricing behavior which lead to the inference of predatory intent. Id.
51. 659 F2d 340 (3d Cir 1981).
52. Double H. Plastics,732 F2d at 355.
53. Id. The document in question was the defendant's internal memorandum which
stated the importance of retaining NCR (an industry leader) as a customer. Id. By doing so,
the defendant would prevent NCR and NCR's competitors from switching to a newer product that acted as a substitute for the defendant's product. Such conduct required selling to
NCR at lower prices than other customers. Id.
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judgment" and not predatory intent. 54 Such a holding is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Utah Pie
Co., which held that conduct similar to that of the defendant's in
this case was violative of the Act.
In 1984, the FTC announced rules for approaching monopolization attempts.5 5 Prices above average variable costs were to be presumed lawful; prices below average variable costs raised a rebuttable presumption of being unlawfully predatory. 56 These guidelines
were very favorable to defendants in predatory pricing cases. The
use of variable costs as the standard measurement and the allowance of rebutting the presumption of being unlawfully predatory
was contrary to the decision in Utah Pie Co.
The FTC in ITT ContinentalBaking Co. 57 announced that primary line injury can be shown by (1) market analysis which demonstrates actual injury to competition, or (2) showing predatory intent which fosters an inference of competitive injury.5 8 The FTC
stated that predatory intent can be shown by direct evidence or it
can be inferred from predatory conduct. 59 The FTC ruled that ITT
had not committed unlawful price discrimination.60 Thus the com54. Id. The court argued that the defendant's goal was to increase sales volume and
that this goal was quite normal for businesses. Id. Compare the Utah Pie Co., 386 US 685
(1967) decision with the Third Circuit's opinion in Double H. Plastics,Inc., 732 F2d 351 (3d
Cir 1983). The decision reached by the Third Circuit failed to follow the precedent set forth
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Utah Pie Co., 386 US 685 (1967).
55. General Foods Corp., [1983-87 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg Rep (CCH) § 22,142
(FTC Order, April 6, 1984).
56. Id. The FTC did not resolve the General Foods Corp. case by using these rules.
LaRue, 53 Antitrust L J at 870-71 (cited in note 6). Instead, it analyzed whether the defendant's conduct was likely to result in a monopoly. Id. Thus, it used a rule most often used for
Sherman Act inquiries. Id.
57. [1983-87 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg Rep (CCH) § 22,188 (FTC Order, July 25,
1984).
58. Id.
59. Id. Commissioner Douglas' opinion detailed predatory pricing rules and what evidence can rebut such presumptions. LaRue, 53 Antitrust L J at 872 (cited in note 6). Three
rules were established: (1) when price exceeds average total costs such conduct is to be
conclusively presumed lawful; (2) when price exceeds average variable cost there is a strong
presumption of lawfulness; and (3) when price is below average variable costs there is a
rebuttable presumption of unlawfulness. Sale of perishable or obsolete goods, introductory
prices and sales to maintain goodwill may be strong evidence to rebut this rule. Id.
60. Price discrimination is not unlawful per se. FTC v Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 US
536, 549 (1960). The FTC opined that ITT's conduct of price discrimination was over a
short period of time. ITT Corp., [1983-1987 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg Rep (CCH) §
22,188 (cited in note 57). It also believed that average variable costs were not properly accounted. Id. Third, had ITT aggregated its private and brand-name products there would
not have been predatory pricing. Id. Lastly, ITT's conduct was formulated to meet its competition. Id.
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petitive injury requirement has become increasingly more difficult
for plaintiffs to prove. As a result, the chilling effect on competitive
pricing conduct should subside.
Potential Robinson-Patman plaintiffs suffered another blow in
Henry v Chloride.6 1 The Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff on the grounds
that the district court's jury instructions were inaccurate.2 The
district court had stated that competitive injury was satisfied if
competition between the plaintiff and defendant had been, or may
be, negatively impacted. The Court of Appeals defined competitive
injury as a reasonable threat of substantial injury to competition. 3
Such a threat could be shown through market analysis or predatory intent along with an injury to a competitor.6 4 The Court of
Appeals, perhaps influenced by the Areeda and Turner rules,
stated that predatory intent was based on objective economic criteria and not subjective intent.6 5 Thus a trend in which courts have
made subjective intent irrelevant when attempting to analyze
predatory pricing has developed. 6 Plaintiffs must prove injury to
competition generally rather than the lighter burden of specific
67
harm to the plaintiff.
Economic factors have an important role in proving or rebutting
predatory pricing claims. Courts and practitioners must be aware
of what economic evidence is most pertinent in such cases. Market
concentration, the competitiveness of the industry, price trends,
barriers to entry, profitability of the parties and other competitors
before and after the pricing discrimination, and the overall vitality
61. 809 F2d 1334 (8th Cir 1987).
62. Henry, 809 F2d at 1340-41.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id at 1345-47.
66. Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit in McGahee v Northern Propane Gas Co., 858
F2d 1487 (11th Cir 1988), questioned in A.A. Poultry Farms Inc. v Rose Acre Farms,Inc.,
881 F2d 1396, 1405 (7th Cir 1989), cert denied - US -, 110 S Ct 1326 (1990), used the
subjective intent of the defendant to reverse summary judgement for the defendant. The
court used a sliding scale in which the degree of subjective intent needed to prove predatory
pricing rises as prices move closer to average total cost and away from average variable cost.
McGahee, 858 F2d at 1503.
67. Coutroulis, 57 Antitrust L J at 938-39 (cited in note 11). The author lists several
decisions which have also held that competitive injury must be to the market generally
rather than specifically to the plaintiff. Id at 939 n.13. See Foremost Pro Color v Eastman
Kodak Co., 703 F2d 534, 548 (9th Cir 1983); D.E. Rogers Assoc., Inc. v Gardner-DenverCo.,
718 F2d 1431, 1439 (6th Cir 1983). These cases have held that the plaintiff must show that
competitive injury was to the market generally and not merely to the plaintiff specifically.
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of the economy are some of the factors that must be considered. 8
In A.A. Poultry Farms,Inc. v Rose Acre Farms,Inc.,"e the plaintiffs failed to show competitive injury. 70 The Court of Appeals determined that the egg industry was not conducive for a defendant
to recoup its losses if indeed its low prices were designed to gain
monopoly power in the future.7 1 Thus antitrust injury was not
found.7 2 The court stated that this "recoupment approach," as opposed to determining cost data, made analysis of complicated antitrust cases much more expedient and cost efficient. 73 This approach is useful in determining whether predatory pricing exists,
but it should not be the sole economic factor that courts use. In
fact, the Seventh Circuit analyzed other economic data but ignored
74
subjective intent in reaching its ruling.
A North Carolina district court, in Liggett Group, Inc. v Brown
and Williamson Tobacco,7 5 set aside a jury's verdict for the plaintiff.7 6' The court rejected the Utah Pie Co. rationale for what constituted competitive injury.7 7 Instead, it held that objective economic data must show predatory intent which may reasonably
injure competition and consumer welfare. 78 Once again, this decision relied on objective economic factors and disregarded subjective intent. However, this court specifically mentioned that con79
sumer welfare must also be considered.
68. Coutroulis, 57 Antitrust L J at 939 (cited in note 11). For a more specific review
of which factors are favorable to each party, see Frederick M. Rowe, Price Discrimination
Under The Robinson-Patman Act 160-63 (Little, Brown & Co. 1962).
69. 881 F2d 1396 (7th Cir 1989), cert denied, US -,
110 S Ct 1326 (1990).
70. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc., 881 F2d at 1396. Seven plaintiffs brought suit against
defendant for selling its eggs at "special" low prices. A jury found that pricing was preda-

tory and thus was violative of the Act. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. See Cargill,Inc. v Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 US 104 (1986); MatsushitaElec.
Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US 574 (1986). The Seventh Circuit relied on these
two cases which had recently used the recoupment approach. A.A. Poultry Farms Inc., 881
F2d at 1401.
73. A.A. Poultry Farms Inc., 881 F2d at 1401.
74. Id.
75.
76.
damages
77.

748 F Supp 344 (MD NC 1990).
Liggett Group, Inc., 748 F Supp at 348. Plaintiff was awarded $49.6 million in
which was trebled for a total $148.6 million. Id.
Id at 351-58.

78. Id.
79. Id at 355. It is reasonable to presume that consumer welfare was an important
element in the decisions previously analyzed although it was not specifically mentioned.
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B.

Secondary Line

A secondary line case arises when a buyer brings suit against its
supplier for selling to the buyer's competitor(s) at a price lower
than that at which the buyer can buy.
In FTC v Morton Salt Co., 0 the Supreme Court of the United
States found that the defendant salt manufacturer had committed
unlawful price discrimination. The manufacturer had implemented
a pricing policy which provided lower costs per case to those who
bought large quantities 1 The defendant argued that these discounts were not discriminatory because they were available to all
buyers. The Court rejected this contention by stating that, in reality, these discounts were not available to all buyers.8 2
The Supreme Court delved into the legislative intent of the Act
and concluded that the Act was designed to limit the buying power
advantage that large purchasers had over small ones.8 3 The competitive injury requirement, as stated by Justice Black, is incipient
in nature. 4 The plaintiff must show only that the price discrimination may lessen, injure, destroy or prevent competition. The Court
opined that it can easily be inferred that such injury exists when
certain merchants must pay more than their competitors.8 5 The
defendant, according to Justice Black, failed to economically cost
justify its discounts which would have disproved unlawfulness.88
The defendant argued that table salt makes up such a small percentage of a grocery store's sales that any price differentials were
87
inconsequential. The Court rejected this de minimus defense.
The standard set in Morton Salt Co. is quite favorable to a
plaintiff. In effect, if a plaintiff can show a price discrimination,
then competitive injury will be inferred because harm will usually
be self-evident. To hold otherwise and force a plaintiff to actually
prove injury would greatly reduce the Act's effectiveness.88
80. 334 US 37 (1948), limited in Border Co. v FTC, 339 F2d 953 (7th Cir 1964).
81. Morton Salt Co., 334 US at 41. The prices ranged from $1.60 per case for
purchases of less than a carload to $1.35 per case for prices of 50,000 cases within a twelve

month period. Id.
82. Id at 42-43. The Court mentioned how some of the buyers were so small that they
never qualified for such discounts. Id.
83. Id at 43-44. The statute did this, the Court stated, by limiting price differentials
to actual costs savings. Id.
84. Id at 46.
85. Id at 46-51.

86. Id at 48.
87.
88.

Id at 48-49.
Id at 49-51.
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In Forster Mfg. Co. v FTC,8 9 the First Circuit stated that the
plaintiff must only show that competitive injury may reasonably,
as opposed to likely, occur.90 The court, like the United States Supreme Court in Morton Salt Co., held that price differentials
among competing purchasers is proof enough of competitive injury.91 Quantity discounts must be proven to be lawful through
cost justification.92
The two holdings previously discussed were extremely favorable
to plaintiffs in secondary line cases. However, in 1981, plaintiffs in
secondary line cases received an unfavorable decision. The Supreme Court of the United States in J. Truett Payne Co. v
Chrysler Motors Corp.9 3 held that plaintiffs must show actual competitive injury to recover damages. Money damages for a Robinson-Patman violation can only be recovered under section 4 of the
Clayton Act upon a showing of actual injury from conduct the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.9 4 Proof of injury under the
Act only suffices to obtain injunctive relief.9 The United States
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that an inference
of competitive injury suffices to recover monetary damages under
section 4 of the Clayton Act just as it suffices to obtain injunctive
relief. 96
The Court reasoned that Robinson-Patman is an incipiency statute while section 4 of the Clayton Act is remedial; thus it was held
that plaintiffs face a higher burden of proof under section 4.97 The
Court relied on the legislative history to support its view.9 8
The difficult issue of approximating damages in price discrimination cases was also addressed.9 9 The Court had previously accepted the premise that damages could be estimated based on sales
the plaintiff would have made if there had been no price discrimi89. 335 F2d 47 (1st Cir 1964).
90. Forster Mfg., 335 F2d at 51-54.
91. Id at 54. The First Circuit did not cite Morton Salt Co., 334 US 37 (1948), as
authority for its holding.
92. Forster Mfg, 335 F2d at 53. There the court cited Morton Salt Co., 334 US 37
(1948), as authority.
93. 451 US 557 (1981).
94. J. Truett Payne Co., 451 US at 562.
95. Id at 561-62.
96. Id at 561.
97. Id at 561-62.
98. Id at 562-63. Congress eliminated the damages provision of the original version of
the Act. S Rep No 1502, 74th Cong, 2d Sess 8 (1936).
99. J. Truett Payne Co., 451 US at 565.
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nation. 10 0 Courts were willing to accept such estimates because exacting damages would have been nearly impossible, and defendants
should not benefit from such uncertainty. 11 In J. Truett Payne
Co., the Court failed to adhere to this standard because evidence
0 2
proving that the defendant was a wrongdoer was insubstantial.
Thus, the burden of proving damages was lessened once an antitrust violation had been established.0 3 This is a curious holding
because the issues of money damages and whether a violation has
occurred should be independently decided. Courts should not be
able to hedge on the damages issue because it was unsure of its
decision that a violation had, in fact, occurred.
The Eighth Circuit in Rose Confections, Inc. v Ambrosia Chocolate Co.104 and the Supreme Court of the United States in Falls
City Indus., Inc. v Vanco Beverage, Inc., 0 5 clarified the tests for
demonstrating competitive injury in secondary line cases: (1)
whether direct evidence illustrates that disfavored competitors actually lost profits or sales due to the price discrimination, or (2)
whether the price discrimination was substantial in time and
scope. Either test when satisfied allows competitive injury to be
inferred. 0 6
The burden of proving a secondary line injury is much lighter
than proving a primary line injury. 107 In his article, The Increasing
Pivotal Competitive Injury Requirement in Secondary Line Cases
under the Robinson-PatmanAct: Relevant Factors in Today's Environment, Chris S. Coutroulis discusses evidence which may rebut
proof of a prima facie secondary line case. 0 8
Evidence which breaks the causal nexus between the price discrimination and lost sales or profits will rebut the inference made
in Morton Salt Co.'09 Such evidence will also impact on whether
money damages will be granted under section 4 of the Clayton
110
Act.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
1456 (8th
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Zenith Radio Corp. v Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 US 100, 123-24 (1969).
Hetzel v Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 169 US 26, 39 (1898).
J. Truett Payne Co., 451 US at 567-68.
Id at 568.
816 F2d 381 (8th Cir 1987), holding limited by McDonald v Armontrout, 860 F2d
Cir 1988).
460 US 428 (1983).
Coutroulis, 57 Antitrust L J at 940 (cited in note 11).
Id.
Id.
Id at 940-41.
Id.
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Showing that the favored buyer did not pass its savings on to its
Such
customers may also rebut proof of secondary line injury.'
had
buyer
the
favored
if
because,
be
meaningless
evidence should
kept its discount rather than passed it on down the distribution
chain, such buyer would have still gained a competitive advantage.
The favored buyer will have greater funds available for expenses,
capital expenditures and potential price wars." 2 Thus if RobinsonPatman is truly incipient in nature, such evidence should not rebut
the plaintiff's case.
Proof that the market has remained healthy and competitive is
also important." 3 Such evidence has greater importance in primary
line cases than it does in secondary line cases. Perhaps the importance of market factors implies that competitive injury pertains to
competition generally and not to specific competitors. 1 4 If so,
plaintiffs in secondary line actions will face a greater burden in
proving competitive injury in the future.
Introductory offers may also rebut the inference made in Morton
Salt Co." 5 One court has held that such offers are not substantial
in time or scope."16 Such evidence should not rebut the plaintiff's
case; rather, when introductory offers are involved the plaintiff will
not have satisfied either test enunciated in Rose Confections, Inc.
or Falls City Indus., Inc.
Lastly, proof that the lower prices are lawful functional discounts may get the defendant off the hook."' Such discounts must
truly be functional in nature, not just in name. Defendants should
cost justify these discounts to strengthen their defense." 8
In Mays v Massey-Ferguson,Inc.," 9 the plaintiff dealer brought
suit against its supplier for offering price discounts to other dealers
on agricultural and industrial equipment. 2 0 The court granted the
111. Id at 941-42.
112. Id at 942.
113. Id at 943. See Hasbrouck v Texaco, 830 F2d 1513 (9th Cir 1987), modified in
Hasbrouck v Texaco, 842 F2d 1034 (9th Cir 1988), for an ilustration of the importance this
factor had in determining whether competitive injury was present.
114. Bordon Co. v FTC, 381 F2d 175 (5th Cir 1967); Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v Texaco,
Inc., 637 F2d 105 (3d Cir 1980), criticized in Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v Monsanto Co., 684
F2d 1226 (7th Cir 1982); Battle v Lubrizol Corp., 673 F2d 984 (8th Cir 1982); Filco v Amana
Refrigeration,Inc., 709 F2d 1257 (9th Cir 1983).
115. Coutroulis, 57 Antitrust L J at 949-50 (cited in note 11).
116. Dairy King, Inc. v Kraft Inc., 645 F Supp 126 (D Md 1986).
117. Texaco, Inc. v Hasbrouck, - US -, 110 S Ct 2535, 2550 (1990).
118. Morton Salt Co., 334 US at 48.
119. Mays v Massey-Ferguson,Inc., 1990-1 Trade Cas (CCH) 1 69,028 (SD Ga 1990).
69,028, 63,640 (cited in note 119).
120. Mays, at 1111
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defendant's motion for summary judgment.1 2 1 Plaintiff failed to
prove competitive injury even though it had paid higher prices
than did other dealers of the defendant. 122 The court's decision
hinged on three factors: (1) plaintiff's failure to show that it had
competed with these favored dealers; (2) the price discrimination
was not substantial in time and scope; and (3) plaintiff's inability
to prove that defendant's discounts were not available to the
123
plaintiff.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Alan's of Atlanta, Inc. v Minolta
Corp.,2 4 stated that competitive injury has been proven when
there is "a reasonable possibility that competition . . . with the
favored customer specifically may be adversely affected ... ."125
The court went to great lengths to explain its rationale for holding
that the Act proscribed injury to competitors.12 6 Economic reasoning seems to say that injury to competition will not usually include
the protection of specific competitors. 12 7 However, the court placed
greater weight on judicial precedent in holding that specific com28
petitors were protected.
In Texaco, Inc. v Hasbrouck, 9 the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that the Act covered injuries to competition
between the favored and the disfavored purchaser as well as injury
to competition between their customers. 3 0 Texaco was held liable
121. Id.
122. Id at 63,637, citing Falls City Indus., Inc. v Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 US 428
(1983) (for determining what constitutes competitive injury); J. Truett Payne Co., 451 US
557 (1981) (presumably as authority for what must be demonstrated to recover money
damages).
123. Mays at %963,637-40 (cited in note 119).
124. 903 F2d 1414 (11th Cir 1990).
125. Alan's of Atlanta, Inc., 903 F2d at 1417. Summary Judgment for the defendant
was reversed and remanded. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Economic arguments state that the protection of competition must consider
consumer welfare. Thus, the protection of individual competitors is not usually an aid to
consumer welfare. Of course, when the number of competitors in a market is small, then
protection of each competitor may foster competition generally and enhance consumer welfare. See R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself 58-61 (Basic Books,
Inc. 1978), and Ball Memorial Hesp., Inc. v Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F2d 1325, 1334
(7th Cir 1986), criticized in Reazin v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., 899 F Supp 951
(10th Cir 1990), for a more detailed analysis of this issue.
128. Alan's of Atlanta, Inc., 903 F2d at 1418 n.6. The court cited cases which have
held either way in deciding whether injury to competition precludes injury to competitors
specifically. Id.
129.
130.

US --, 110 S Ct 2535 (1990).
Texaco, Inc., __ US -,
110 S Ct at 2535 (1990). The Court rejected Texaco's

-

argument that the defendant should not be liable for the pricing policies of its buyers. Id.
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for violating the Act because its discounts were not truly functional.1 31 Thus, the Court through its use of the inference made in
Morton Salt Co., found the requisite injury to competition. 13 2 The
majority also permitted the plaintiffs, once a violation of the Act
was established, to provide an imperfect estimation of the monetary damages resulting from its antitrust injury. 13 3
34
The Third Circuit, in J.F.Feeser, Inc. v Serv-A-Portion, Inc.,1
vacated the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment in favor
of the defendant. The Third Circuit stated that the Act was intended to preserve both competition generally and individual competitors.3 5 Proof of lost sales or profits or a showing that the price
discrimination between competitors was over a substantial time
period suffices to demonstrate competitive injury.3 6 Testimony of
sales personnel and former customers of the plaintiff illustrated
that the disfavored buyer had in fact lost sales to its favored competitor.13 7 Anticompetitive effects are presumed when (1) the disfavored buyer's resale prices have been influenced, or (2) market
conditions are characterized by low profit margins and intense
competition.' Ironically, the court relied on general market conditions to prove specific injury to a competitor.
Do WE NEED THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT?
Legal scholars have debated whether the Act promotes competition and whether the Act is superfluous. Even the Department of
Justice, in its 1977 report, questioned the effects of the Act.3 9 The
report suggested that small independent merchants have suffered
more harm than good because of the Act. 140 The Robinson-Patman
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 909 F2d 1524 (3d Cir 1990).
135. J.F.FeeserInc., 909 F2d at 1532-33, citing Earl W. Kintner and Joseph P. Bauer,
3 FederalAntitrust Laws: The Robinson-PatmanAct § 22.2 at 250 (Anderson, 1983), Morton Salt Co., 334 US 37 (1948), and Texaco, Inc., - US -, 110 S Ct 2535 (1990).
136. J.F. Feeser Inc., 909 F2d at 1535.
137. Id at 1535-38.
138. Id at 1538. The parties admitted that the frozen food market fit this characterization. Id.
139. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Report on the Robinson-Patman Act,
254-59 (1977).
140. Id. The Department of Justice reported that, although a few merchants have
been saved by the Act, the restrictions outweigh the benefits. Id. It also suggested that small
businesses, more so than large ones, run afoul of the Act, thus incurring potentially devastating legal expenses. Id.
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statute, according to the Department of Justice, causes or maintains "price inflexibility, price fixing and the erection of barriers to
entry which forestall new competitors and thus eventually lead to
the decline of innovation in the protected, incumbent industries."14 1 Certainly, such results are not consistent with the goals of
the Act and the goals of other antitrust statutes, as they should
be.14 2 The end results are that (1) buyers are fearful of negotiating
price reductions, 43 (2) sellers are hesitant to compete by providing
14
discounts, and (3) consumers are forced to pay higher prices.
There has also been much discussion on whether the Act is superfluous. Arguments have been made which suggest that the Act
serves no purpose different from that of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 14 5 More specifically, primary line cases involving predatory
pricing have used the same type of analysis used in Sherman Act
section 2 cases. 46 The court in International Air Indus., Inc. v
American Excelsior Co.,14 rejected the contention that the Act implies a lighter 8evidentiary burden on the plaintiff than does the
14
Sherman Act.
The FTC, in In re General Foods Corp.,4 9 also stated that the
two statutes are directed toward the same goal of protecting com50
petition and thus each statute should require similar standards.
Other Robinson-Patman cases have been analyzed in a method
similar to predation cases under the Sherman Act.' 5 '
141. Id.
142. Automatic Canteen Co. v FTC, 346 US 61, 73 (1953).
143. A buyer under section 2(f) of the Act is liable if it knowingly induces or receives
unlawful price discrimination. 15 USC § 13(f) (1914).
144. Department of Justice, Report on the Robinson-PatmanAct, 254-59 (1977).
145. InternationalAir Indus., Inc. v American Excelsior Co., 517 F2d 714, 720 n.10
(5th Cir 1975), criticized in Barry Wright Corp. v ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F2d 227 (1st Cir
1983), and Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F2d 427 (7th Cir
1980); In re General Foods Corp., 103 FTC 204 (1984); Liggett Group Inc., 748 F Supp 344;
A.A. Poultry Farms Inc., 881 F2d 1396 (7th Cir 1989).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act reads, in relevant part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
,. . shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
15 USC § 2 (1890).
146. InternationalAir Indus., 517 F2d at 720 n.10.
147. 517 F2d 714 (5th Cir 1975).
148. InternationalAir Indus., 517 F2d at 720 n.10. The court opined that the words,
"may be to substantially lessen competition," did not justify a lesser burden on the plaintiff.
Id.
149. 103 FTC 204 (1984).
150. In re General Foods Corp., 103 FTC 204 (1984).
151. For an illustration of how courts have used an analysis for price discrimination
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However, more recently in J.F. Feeser, Inc., the Third Circuit
agreed with the First Circuit's decision in Monahan'sMarine, Inc.
v Boston Whaler, Inc.,'1 52 that the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act do not protect the same thing. 15 The court held that the
Sherman Act protects competition whereas the Robinson-Patman
Act protects competitors.'" In contrast to these recent decisions,
the courts in Liggett Group, Inc., and A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc.,
have held that the competitive injury analysis under both statutes
is the same. 1 55 Perhaps, as Coutroulis suggests, the type of competitive injury analysis chosen between the two statutes depends on
the facts of each case as well as which particular court decides the
issue. 156
Certainly the Act must become more flexible to enhance competition. Such alterations must reflect changes in the economy. For
example, cooperatives which enable smaller merchants to attain
buying power similar to that of the large chain stores are much
more prevalent in today's economy. Changes to the Act must reflect that smaller buyers can better compete with larger buyers.
Thus, the scope of the Act does not have to be as broad as it was
when such economic resources were unavailable.
Primary line Robinson-Patman protection must be repealed.
The threat of Robinson-Patman litigation suppresses competition.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, with its greater burden of proving
competitive injury, will prevent attempts to monopolize while not
restricting competitive pricing as much as the Act does. Recently,
courts have been tough on primary line plaintiffs, which further
supports that primary line protection is unnecessary. Lastly, the
original intent of Congress was to protect small buyers (i.e., secondary line injury). Thus if any changes are appropriate, it is those
which will protect secondary line plaintiffs rather than primary
line plaintiffs. These changes will result in more price competition
and consequently more favorable conditions for consumers. A claricases similar to the analysis used for monopolizing conduct under section 2 of the Sherman
Act, see William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F2d 1014,
1042 (9th Cir 1982); JanichBros. Inc. v American Distilling Co., 570 F2d 848, 855 (9th Cir
1977); PacificEngineering& Prod. Co. of Nev. v Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F2d 790, 798 (10th
Cir 1977); 0. Hommel Co. v Ferro Corp., 659 F2d 340, 348 (3d Cir 1981).
152. 866 F2d 525 (1st Cir 1989).
153. J.F. Feeser Inc., 909 F2d at 1535.
154. Id.
155. Liggett Group Inc., 748 F Supp at 352; A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc., 881 F2d at
1399.
156. Coutroulis, 57 Antitrust L J at 936 (cited in note 11).
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fication of what standards are used to determine whether a Robinson-Patman violation has occurred will also benefit competitors,
the courts, and antitrust practitioners.
Recent developments in Robinson-Patman litigation indicate
that confusion still exists. Courts have reached conflicting opinions
on the competitive injury issue. As a result, counselors must be
cautious in advising their clients. Risk analysis must be performed
to determine whether bringing suit or pricing in such a way that it
is likely to result in litigation makes economic sense. The potential
amount of damages, the cost of litigation, the exposure of litigation, employee morale, the likelihood of successfully winning in
court, the effect of business interruptions, which court will decide
the case, and the expected profitability of the pricing conduct are
just some of the factors lawyers must consider.
In primary line cases, most courts are permitting defendants to
act more competitively. Objective cost data and market data carry
more evidentiary weight than does the defendant's subjective intent. However, not all courts have followed these trends. Also, the
Supreme Court's decision in Utah Pie Co. has never been expressly
overruled. Thus there still exists a remote possibility that courts
will follow the Utah Pie Co. decision and penalize defendants for
what appears to be sound price competition.
Secondary line cases are much more likely to result in a victory
for the plaintiff than are primary line cases which favor defendants. The burden of proving secondary line as compared to primary line competitive injury is much easier. 15 However, there is
still a great amount of conflict and uncertainty in this area. Thus,
the outcomes of secondary line cases as opposed to primary line
cases are much more difficult to predict. Secondary line cases are
heavily fact oriented; therefore practitioners must be well prepared
with pertinent economic data in anticipation of secondary line litigation. Proof of lost sales or profits or that the price discrimination
was substantial in scope and time are of paramount importance to
proving competitive injury in secondary line cases. Also, factors
which break the causal nexus or substantiate an affirmative defense must be analyzed.
In summary, practitioners must rely on the aforementioned cases
and developments only when litigation seems likely. Otherwise, a
cautious counseling approach which carefully considers the risks
and the rewards of potentially becoming entangled in a price dis157. Id.
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crimination conflict will be more advisable in the unpredictable
world of Robinson-Patman legislation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Determining what constitutes competitive injury is not an easy
task. Whether the Act protects competitors specifically or competition generally is still unclear. Congress and the Supreme Court of
the United States need to clarify such confusion. Prior decisions,
such as Utah Pie Co., which are incorrect must be expressly overruled. The Act must be more clearly written and the intent behind
the statute must be clearly expressed. Cases construing such legislation must be decided in accordance with the Act's purpose. Protection of primary line plaintiffs is unnecessary under the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2 of the Sherman Act can achieve the
same goals without being as restrictive on price competition. By
increasing the plaintiff's burden in such cases, courts have shown
their unwillingness to suppress competition. Repeal of this protection will benefit consumers, sellers, the courts and antitrust
practitioners.
Protection from secondary line discrimination is an admirable
goal. However, such protection must not be enforced to the point
where it becomes inflexible. Rigid standards suppress price competition and thereby injure consumers, shrewd buyers, and competitive sellers.
Robinson-Patman suits are still brought because there exists few
standards which have clearly been adopted by the courts. Thus
counselors need to be prudent and their advice should be conservative. Risk analysis is important in determining a client's course of
action. Lawyers need to be aware of economic facts which may
support or rebut proof of competitive injury.
In conclusion, the status of Robinson-Patman case law remains
unsettled. However, there seems to be a trend which favors protecting buyers who are discriminated against by the defendant
supplier in secondary line cases more than protecting sellers who
compete with the defendant in primary line cases. Such a trend
may be evidence that, after fifty-five years, courts are finally construing the Robinson-Patman Act in a manner consistent with
Congress' original intent of protecting small businesses from the
buying power of large chain stores such as A&P. Perhaps the status of Robinson-Patman law has, at last, returned to its roots!
Robert J. Koch

